Tag Archives: deckhand

Texas Federal Judge Sends to Trial Case of Deckhand Who Seriously Injured His Back Trying to Swing a Barge Swivel Winch

In Bordas v. Marquette Transp. Co. Gulf-Inland LLC, 2016 WL 2866266 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 2858905 (S.D. Tex. May 16, 2016), U.S. District Judge Nelva Gonzales Ramos of the Southern District of Texas agreed with U.S. Magistrate Judge Jason B. Libby that Marquette Transportation Company Gulf–Inland, L.L.C. deckhand John Bordas’ case against Marquette, his employer and the operator of his towboat, and Ingram Barge Company, the owner of the barge upon which he was injured, should be tried, and thus denied both defendants’ pretrial motions for summary judgment.  Due to his injuries, Bordas had to undergo three back surgeries, including a lumbar fusion.  He was working as a first mate for Marquette aboard its towboat, the M/V ST. JOSEPH.  Bordas claimed he injured his back while aboard Ingram’s barge, in the process of securing a second barge into tow.  He alleged that as he tried to singlehandedly move the swivel winch on the Ingram barge into position, it became caught or stuck and caused his injury.

The Court described how the defendants tried to lay all blame for the injury on Bordas himself:

“Here, Marquette moves for summary judgment, arguing it cannot be held liable for Plaintiff’s injury because the sole cause of Plaintiff’s injuries ‘was wholly unexpected, undetectable, and was not caused or contributed to by any of Marquette’s acts or omissions.’ Marquette also argues Plaintiff ‘was the only person in a position to judge whether the winch was functioning and how much force he could safely apply.’ In making these arguments, Marquette relies solely on Plaintiff’s testimony that there was adequate crew to perform the operation, Plaintiff inspected the barge beforehand and all equipment appeared normal, nothing indicated the subject winch was defective, and he injured himself when he attempted to move the winch and it did not move or swivel as designed.”

Captain Phillip Hogan, the main captain of the M/V ST. JOSEPH, however, testified at deposition about “the status of swivel winches in the industry, their known hazards, and the condition of the winch in question.”  The Court found Captain Hogan’s testimony sufficient to establish a material issue of fact for trial “as to whether Marquette violated its duty to provide Bordas with a safe place to work through its failure to inspect the Ingram barge and its winches.”  The Court wrote, “an employer has a duty to inspect third party ships to which it sends its employee to work upon….If, by reasonable inspection, Marquette could have discovered the improperly functioning winch, then Marquette can be charged with notice of that condition.”

In denying Ingram–the barge owner’s–motion for summary judgement, the Court again relied on Captain Hogan’s testimony, writing:

“Further, Captain Hogan’s testimony establishes a deck hand from the towing vessel is at some point going to be on a towed barge to make and break tow and the towed barge’s winches are used to make and break tow. A defective or non-functioning winch could easily cause harm to the deckhand of the towing vessel. Captain Hogan’s testimony provides some evidence that the very nature of swivel winches causes hazards that are not present with stationary winches and the industry is moving away from swivel winches due to their hazards. Plaintiff has produced evidence that creates an issue of material fact–whether Ingram knew or should have known the swivel winch on its barge was not working properly and advised Marquette.

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Our law firm, Goldsmith & Ogrodowski, LLC, regularly brings personal injury lawsuits for negligence under the Jones Act and, under the general maritime law, for negligence, unseaworthiness, and maintenance and cure, on behalf of commercial vessel crewmembers–particularly including towboat crewmembers–and their families.  If you have questions about this court opinion, or your or your family’s legal rights under admiralty and maritime law, contact us for a free consultation at 877-404-6529, 412-281-4340, or info@golawllc.com.  Our website is www.golawllc.com.  While we practice primarily in Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Ohio, we will also consider accepting cases anywhere in the U.S., typically with assistance from local counsel.

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Court Finds Harbor Towboat Deckhand Work May Well be a Two-Man Job

In Keeney v. Ingram Barge Company, 2016 WL 1660398 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 27, 2016), a federal district judge in Nashville denied Ingram Barge Company’s motion to dismiss the Jones Act negligence and general maritime law unseaworthiness claims in the lawsuit brought by Chase Keeney, an experienced deckhand aboard its harbor towboat, the M/V WILLARD HAMMOND.  Keeney claimed he had seriously injured his back, and had to undergo back surgery, because he was forced to work alone while building tow, specifically carrying ratchets and jerking wires.

Keeney worked the 12-hour day shift on Ingram’s harbor boat.  He conceded there was nothing wrong with the barge on which he was working, the towboat itself, or any of the wires or ratchets with which he was required to work.  Rather, Keeney claimed Ingram was at fault because he was forced to perform the heavy manual labor of a deckhand unassisted, because the other deckhand on his watch often would not help him, the company knew this, but did nothing about it.

A 35-foot barge wire similar to what Ingram deckhand Chase Keeney was required to carry and "jerk" singlehandedly.

A 35-foot, 100-120 pound, barge wire similar to what deckhand Chase Keeney was required to carry and “jerk” single-handedly.

Keeney’s claims were supported by an expert, Donald J. Green, who opined “the cause of this accident was negligence on the part of the defendants, Ingram Barge Company, for failure to provide Mr. Chase Keeney a safe workplace free from hazards. Reportedly, Mr. Keeney was required to perform repetitive heavy lifting and jerking ratchets to take out slack in ‘laying a wire’ without assistance. These are functions that are typically performed by two persons working together when making tow or securing barges in a tow. Mr. Keeney repeatedly handled heavy rigging wires and ratchets without sufficient assistance. Had another deckhand been available to help Mr. Keeney it is likely that he, Mr. Keeney, would not have had to repetitively strain laying wires making up tows, and it is more likely than not that this incident could have been avoided.”  Green added, “Ingram Barge Company failed to provide proper supervision or instruction to Mr. Keeney regarding safe procedures for transferring rigging wires from barges to tow boats and other barges” and “[r]equiring or allowing Mr. Keeney to work alone deploying or laying wires without assistance more than likely caused his injuries.”

Keeney testified at his deposition that “I was doing the job of two men by myself a lot of the times where it takes two people to pull up a wire and strap it in, I was doing it all by myself.”

The Court found that while the wire and ratchet work Keeney was performing can be done by one man, “it does appear that, if not mandated, it was at least preferable to have two men laying wire.” The Court also found it significant that Keeney had testified at deposition that before his accident he had reported to the captain of his towboat the fact his fellow deckhand, whom Ingram ultimately terminated due to his work habits, was routinely not helping him.

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Our law firm, Goldsmith & Ogrodowski, LLC, regularly brings personal injury lawsuits for negligence under the Jones Act and, under the general maritime law, for negligence, unseaworthiness, and maintenance and cure, on behalf of commercial vessel crewmembers and their families.  If you have questions about this court opinion, or your or your family’s legal rights under admiralty and maritime law, contact us for a free consultation at 877-404-6529, 412-281-4340, or info@golawllc.com.  Our website is www.golawllc.com.  While we practice primarily in Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Ohio, we will also consider taking cases anywhere in the U.S.

Towboat Company’s Pre-Trial Attack on Plaintiff Deckhand’s Liability Expert Fails

In Paster v. Ingram Barge Company, 2015 WL 3680700 (E.D. La. June 12, 2015), deckhand Tommy Paster sued Ingram, his employer and the owner/operator of the towboat, the M/V O.A. FRANKS, alleging he seriously injured his back while standing on the edge of a barge and using a three to four-foot pole with a hook attached to it to grab equipment from the deck of the towboat located several feet below.  After hooking the equipment, Paster was able to pull it up to the barge, unassisted.  And while he was able to work the rest of the day, Paster claims the next day he awoke with pain radiating from his back down his leg — classic signs of a vertebral disc injury.  When he was lifting the equipment the day before, Paster claims he felt a “twinge” in his back.  Paster’s attorney made claims against Ingram in a federal court lawsuit under the Jones Act, for negligence, and under the general maritime law, for unseaworthiness.

Paster’s lawyer hired a liability expert, Robert E. “Bob” Borison, to opine on the cause of Paster’s accident.  In his report, Borison attributed the accident to, among other things, Ingram’s failure to have conducted essentially a job hazard analysis of the lifting operation in question, and failure to have properly trained Paster on proper lifting techniques in these circumstances.  The Court (U.S. District Judge Sarah S. Vance) summarized Borison’s three principal opinions as follows:

“Taken together, Borison’s expert testimony seeks to establish that (1) plaintiff’s work assignment required him to assume an unsafe lifting position, thereby causing his injury, (2) a reasonably competent safety professional would have assigned more manpower or mechanical power to assist plaintiff with the lift, and (3) defendant failed to adequately train plaintiff on proper lifting techniques under the circumstances.”

Ingram filed a pre-trial motion to strike Borison as an expert, to keep the jury from hearing his testimony.  Ingram argued Borison’s opinions were based on insufficient facts, misleading, and would not be helpful to the jury.  Ingram did not attack Borison’s qualifications, just his opinions.

In addressing Ingram’s motion, Judge Vance first ruled that “Borison’s proposed testimony is not within the scope of a layman’s common experience.  Contrary to the defendant’s assertions, Borison’s testimony is not simply that ‘someone should not lift something that is too big or too awkward for them to handle.’  Instead, Borison evaluates the specific posture plaintiff allegedly assumed, and opines that defendant failed to provide the necessary manpower or mechanical assistance to allow plaintiff to make the lift safely.  Borison is undoubtedly more familiar with the tools plaintiff was using, the equipment plaintiff was lifting, and the safety risks associated with working on barges than the average layperson.  Moreover, as an instructor ‘in the proper method of manual material handling,’ Borison is qualified to opine about the appropriate or customary level of training in the maritime industry.”  So, the Court found that, “Borison’s experience and specialized knowledge regarding maritime safety and industry custom will assist the trier of fact in determining whether [Ingram’s] conduct fell beneath the applicable standard of care in this case.”

Judge Vance was also unpersuaded by Ingram’s argument that Borison’s opinions were misleading or factually deficient.  As to Ingram’s criticism of Borison’s report insofar as it, in Ingram’s counsel’s words, “creates negligent-sounding section titles that imply Ingram did something wrong, and then declines to identify how Ingram actually merited his condemnation or discusses something entirely different …,” the Court found Borison’s report’s section titles were not evidence and the defendant’s argument “exalts form over substance and erroneously focuses on Borison’s section headings and typeface rather than on the content of Borison’s report.”  Judge Vance noted that Borison had written in his report that Ingram had caused plaintiff to assume an unsafe lifting position, failed to allocate sufficient resources to allow plaintiff to make the lift safely, and failed to adequately train plaintiff.”

Finally, in ruling that Borison would be permitted to testify before the jury as to each of the opinions appearing in his report, Judge Vance wrote:

“Although the Court agrees that Borison’s report is not the model of clarity, defendant’s cavils about Borison’s headings do not render Borison’s underlying opinions inadmissible.  Moreover, Borison states that he bases his opinions on an interview with plaintiff, defendant’s records, and thirty years of experience in the industry.  To the extent defendant disputes the underlying facts or disagrees with Borison’s interpretation of those facts, defendant may cross-examine Borison at trial.”

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Our law firm, Goldsmith & Ogrodowski, LLC, regularly brings lawsuits for negligence under the Jones Act and unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure under the general maritime law on behalf of commercial vessel crewmembers, both men and women, such as deckhands, mates, cooks, engineers, pilots, and captains, and we regularly hire liability experts to assist the jury’s understanding of how and why our clients’ accidents occurred.  If you have questions about this court opinion, or your or your family’s legal rights under admiralty and maritime law, contact us for a free consultation at 877-404-6529, 412-281-4340, or info@golawllc.com.  Our website is www.golawllc.com.  We practice primarily in Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Ohio, but also all over the inland waterways.

Federal Judge Refuses to Enforce Release Deckhand Signed While Unrepresented by Counsel, Lacking Specialized Medical Advice, and Paid Only $860 for Serious Back Injury

While deckhanding for Double J. Marine, LLC aboard its towboat, the M/V MISS KAYLYNN, Matthew Nuber seriously injured his back while pulling on a face wire.  On the day of the accident, Nuber only had the benefit of an emergency room physician’s opinion, without any diagnostic testing, such as an x-ray or an MRI, that he had only pulled a muscle.  One week later, Nuber returned to the ER where another physician released him to work full duty, still without any diagnostic testing, and without the opinion of a specialist, such as an orthopedic or neurosurgeon.

A deckhand handling a facewire.

A deckhand handling a face wire aboard a barge.

Later the same day, deckhand Nuber met with the vessel owner’s claims adjuster at a gas station and signed a “Receipt, Release, and Hold Harmless Agreement.”  The adjuster read and explained the release to Nuber and Nuber signed the release, purportedly knowingly giving up all his claims against Double J for the shipboard accident.  In exchange for signing the release, Double J paid Nuber only $860.  Nuber returned to work for Double J the next day.

About one month later, Nuber’s back pain returned.  Double J placed him on light duty, until Nuber could no longer continue to work.  Then, Double J finally sent Nuber to see a back specialist, an orthopedic surgeon, who promptly ordered an MRI.  The doctor diagnosed Nuber with herniated discs, recommended surgery, and opined the shipboard accident had caused the back injury.  Nuber then demanded Double J pay him maintenance and cure under the general maritime law.  Double J responded by filing this lawsuit, seeking a declaratory judgment that the release Nuber signed insulated it from Nuber’s claims.  Nuber then filed a Jones Act negligence, general maritime law unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure lawsuit against Double J in state court.

In Double J. Marine, LLC v. Nuber, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173408 (E.D. La. Dec. 11, 2013), U.S. District Judge Martin L.C. Feldman of the Eastern District of Louisiana denied Double J’s motion for summary judgment, finding there were fact issues as to whether the release was enforceable.  Consistent with longstanding admiralty law, Judge Feldman discussed how the courts are charged with being protective of the rights of seamen:

“Seamen are wards of admiralty law, whose rights federal courts are duty-bound to jealously protect. … In protecting their rights, the Court must be ‘particularly vigilant to guard against overreaching when a seaman purports to release his right to compensation for personal injuries.’ … At the same time, however, the Court must balance the utility of maintaining confidence in the finality of such settlements. … In carefully scrutinizing releases or settlement agreements involving seamen, the Court must ultimately determine whether the seaman had ‘an informed understanding of his rights and a full appreciation of the consequences’ of executing the release at the time he executed it.”

Judge Feldman further wrote how the seaman’s employer bears the burden of proving the validity of a release, how the amount of money he or she is paid for the release is significant, as is the nature and extent of any medical and legal advice the seaman had available to him or her when signing the release:

“The party claiming that the matter has been settled bears the burden of demonstrating that a seaman’s release of claims was ‘executed freely, without deception or coercion, and that it was made by the seaman with full understanding of his rights.’ …  Adequacy of consideration is one factor for the Court to consider in determining whether the seaman had an informed understanding of his rights. … However, the Court ‘lacks authority, especially where the seaman testifies to complete satisfaction, to void the agreement simply because the court thinks the seaman could have negotiated a better deal.’ … Another factor the Court considers in determining whether the seaman had an informed understanding of his rights is the nature of medical and legal advice available to him. … In this regard, a seaman ‘may have to take his chances’ that a properly diagnosed condition is ‘more serious and extensive than originally thought.’ … Other factors the Court considers include whether the parties negotiated at arm’s length and in good faith, and whether there is the appearance of fraud, deception, coercion, or overreaching.”

Here, Judge Feldman had to review competing versions of the gas station release signing: a transcript of the “ceremony” versus an affidavit from Nuber.  He concluded the release could not be summarily enforced against Nuber.  The Court’s analysis:

“Double J. contends that the record establishes that, at the time of releasing his rights, Nuber had an informed understanding of his rights and a full appreciation of the consequences. The Court disagrees. The record includes, on the one hand, a transcript of the meeting between Nuber and the adjuster in which Nuber indicated that he understood his rights and agreed to release them, and on the other, an affidavit executed by Nuber in which he swears he did not fully understand the ramifications of the release. That alone creates a genuine issue regarding whether Nuber executed the release freely and with a full understanding of his rights.”

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“The record also reveals that Nuber has only completed the 10th grade in special education classes, that he only received $530 in [new] consideration for settlement, and that he was not represented by counsel when he executed the release. ‘Although a court may uphold a release even when the seaman is not represented by his own attorney, [the Fifth Circuit] has repeatedly emphasized the importance of counsel in determining whether a seaman fully understood his rights and the consequences of releasing those rights.’ … Neither did Nuber receive an independent medical opinion regarding his injuries before executing the release.”

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“Double J. contends that the record clearly establishes that Nuber received adequate medical advice. The Court again disagrees. The record reveals that, before he signed the release, Nuber was treated twice at River Parishes Hospital where he was diagnosed with a pulled muscle and told to return to work. The emergency room physicians did not conduct any diagnostic testing, and did not refer Nuber to a specialist. When Nuber later sought more treatment, Dr. Nutik ordered an MRI, diagnosed Nuber with herniated discs, and recommended surgery. The record at least reveals a genuine issue regarding the adequacy of the medical advice Nuber initially received, if not a mutual mistake regarding the nature of Nuber’s injury.”

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“Finally, although Double J. maintains that the parties negotiated at an arm’s length and in good faith, the record shows that Nuber signed the release at a gas station on the very same day he received treatment. Double J. has failed to meet its burden of establishing that Nuber signed the release freely, without deception or coercion, and with a full understanding of his rights.”

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Our law firm, Goldsmith & Ogrodowski, LLC, represents the families of captains, pilots, mates, deckhands, engineers, and cooks who work aboard towboats, barges, and other commercial vessels, and who are seriously injured or killed on the job.  If you have questions about your or your family’s legal rights under the Jones Act or the general maritime law, also known as “admiralty law,” feel free to contact us at 877-404-6529 or 412-281-4340.  Our website is www.golawllc.com.  Our e-mail address is info@golawllc.com.

In Vessel Owner’s Limitation of Liability Act Case in Federal Court, Injured Claimant Need Not Stipulate to Owner’s Right to Seek Exoneration

In two unrelated Vessel Owner’s Limitation of Liability Act (46 U.S.C. § 30501, et. seq.) cases decided the same day, a Wheeling, West Virginia-based federal judge ruled in Complaint of: Bellaire Harbor Service, LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117991 (N.D. W. Va. Aug. 20, 2013) and In re Campbell Transportation Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117992 (N.D. W. Va. Aug. 20, 2013), that the vessel owners were seeking more than the general maritime law entitled them to in attempting to require the injured claimants–both Jones Act seamen–to stipulate, in order to resume their West Virginia state court lawsuits, that the vessel owners were entitled to litigate the issue of exoneration from liability, in addition to the issue of limitation of liability, in federal court.  The Court wrote:

“If courts required an exoneration stipulation prior to lifting the stay on a case, courts would be ‘enlarg[ing] shipowners’ rights under the Limitation Act and abridg[ing] claimants’ rights under the savings to suitor clause’….This Court agrees with the Fifth Circuit’s explanation and analysis of the issue. Thus, again this Court finds that the claimants need not stipulate to the plaintiffs’ right to litigate the exoneration issue in this Court. The claimants’ stipulation to the plaintiffs’ right to litigate all issues related to the limitation of liability, along with the claimants’ other stipulations, is sufficient for this Court to lift the injunction on the state court action and grant the motion to stay this action.”

The Court also held in the cases:

  1. The husband and wife claimants’ stipulation that the claims of the injured husband will have irrevocable priority over the claims for damages of the wife transformed the case into the functional  equivalent of a single claimant case, protecting the vessel owner while allowing the claimants to pursue their state court action;
  2. The claimants are not required to agree to limit damages to the value of the vessel and its attending freight, nor are they required to stipulate to the precise amount of the limitation fund, or rather the precise amount of the vessel owners’ interest in the vessel and freight; and
  3. It was improper to determine [at this early stage] whether the claimants’ maintenance and cure claim was subject to the Vessel Owners’ Limitation of Liability Act.

Our law firm, Goldsmith & Ogrodowski, LLC, represents the towboat deckhand claimants in the above cases and we regularly represent deckhands and other crewmen of towboats, barges, and other commercial vessels who are seriously injured or killed on the job.   If you have questions about your or your family’s legal rights under maritime, or admiralty, law, feel free to contact us at 877-404-6529 or 412-281-4340.  Our website is www.golawllc.com.  Our e-mail address is info@golawllc.com.

Lead Mate Aboard Towboat Secures $621K Judgment for Shoulder Injury in Ratchet Accident

Deckhands working with ratchet

Deckhands working with a ratchet on the line deck of a jumbo hopper barge

Quincy Allen was employed by American River Transportation Co. (“ARTCO”) as lead mate aboard the ARTCO towboat, the M/V SCARLETT GEM, a fleet boat on the lower Mississippi River. While assisting in the removal of a barge from the tow of an AEP River Operations, LLC towboat near ARTCO’s Kenner Bend Fleet, Allen sustained a serious shoulder injury. The AEP deckhand assisting Allen kicked loose the coupling on the barge by releasing the pelican hook on a ratchet while the line was under strain. Unbeknownst to the two workers, the wire was kinked and, when it was released, it recoiled and caught Allen’s arm, injuring his shoulder. Allen testified he had specifically instructed the AEP deckhand to warn him before kicking loose the pelican hook, should that become necessary, but, the Court found, the AEP deckhand failed to do so.

Allen’s orthopedic surgeon performed a right shoulder bursectomy, subacromial decompression, distal clavicle resection, and labral debridement. After an attempt to return to work, Allen was required to undergo another surgery to repair a degenerative tear of the proximal biceps with an intact superior labral complex and some fraying of the biceps tendon. The treating surgeon opined that Allen continued to suffer from residual stiffness and pain in his right shoulder and that Allen would be unable to return to heavy-duty work aboard a towboat, that he was permanently restricted to light duty work. Allen settled his claims against his employer, ARTCO, and tried to resume work for fear if he did not he would lose his job, but was physically unable to do so. He then brought suit against AEP.

Following a nonjury trial, the New Orleans-based federal judge found AEP liable in negligence under the general maritime law due to the actions of its deckhand, Allen not liable to any extent, and that Allen was entitled to pain and suffering damages of $150,000, medical damages of $45,048, and past and future lost earnings damages of $426,866. The case is reported at Allen v. AEP River Operations, LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89797 (E.D. La. June 25, 2013).

Our law firm, Goldsmith & Ogrodowski, LLC, regularly represents deckhands and other crewmen of towboats, barges, and other commercial vessels who are seriously injured on the job.  If you have questions about your or your family’s legal rights under maritime, or admiralty, law, feel free to contact us at 877-404-6529, 412-281-4340, or info@golawllc.com.  Our website is www.golawllc.com.

Welcome to Towboatlaw

Welcome to Towboatlaw, a blog focused on admiralty & maritime law as it is applied by judges and lawyers on the rivers and other inland waterways of the United States.  My name is Fred Goldsmith.  I am a lawyer who focuses his practice on admiralty and maritime law.  I, along with my partner, Rich Ogrodowski, am the co-founder of Goldsmith & Ogrodowski, LLC (http://www.golawllc.com), a law firm based in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, which is dedicated to representing workers, or families of workers, who have been seriously injured or killed working aboard towboats and barges as deckhands, pilots, captains, engineers, mates, and cooks.  We practice primarily in Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Ohio, but also all over the inland waterways.

Through this blog I hope to highlight legal and other issues that may interest the men and women, and their families, who work in one of the most important, yet dangerous, occupations in this country.  Towboats push barges on the inland waterways, or “brown waters,” of the United States, transporting products which are critical to the American economy, such as: coal for power plants and steel mills; oil, gasoline, and diesel to power and lubricate cars, trucks, and machinery; sand, gravel, and other aggregates which are used to pave our streets and highways, build our homes, offices, and factories; steel, aluminum, and scrap metals which are the building blocks of automobiles, refrigerators, freezers, and the feedstock for steel mills; and corn and wheat for our domestic food industries and for export.

Paddlewheel towboat “Mark Twain” and barge tow circa 1930s

The basic technology of the river industry, as important as it is, however, has not really changed in over 100 years.  Towboats (sometimes also called “pushboats”), historically powered by steam-driven engines, yet now diesel-powered, still, as they were many decades ago, are wired to (or “faced up” to) and push barges, formerly made of wood, now made of steel.  This industry still requires men and women to be away from home and family for days and weeks at at time.  It still demands these same men and women work around the clock, every single day of the year, in the heat and humidity of a Louisiana summer and the numbing cold of a western Pennsylvania winter.  They must work in ultra-hazardous locations, amidst tremendous forces.

The most unfortunate part of the towboat and barge industry, however, is when companies do not operate their vessels safely.  When companies are unsafe, when they fail to have a corporate culture focused on safety, from the chairman on down, it is these men and women, who serve as deckhands, engineers, captains, pilots, mates, and cooks, who can be seriously injured or killed.  I have been involved in maritime law for over two decades.  I have seen cases involving maritime workers who have suffered, for instance, electrocutions, amputations, and serious back injuries requiring the surgical fusing together of vertebrae and the surgical implantation of titanium rods and screws.

In my law practice, I endeavor to stay abreast of the changing landscape of the law, including state and federal statutes, regulations, and judicial decisions, which applies to the cases I used to defend, but now prosecute, when these hardworking men and women are injured or killed.  Through this blog, I intend to share with you some of these legal developments.  I hope you find the blog interesting and enlightening.

If you have questions you’d like to ask our lawyers about your or your family’s legal rights under admiralty and maritime law, feel free to contact us at 877-404-6529 (toll-free), 412-281-4340, or info@golawllc.com.  Our website is www.golawllc.com.